This document focuses on the advancement of China’s electrical grid over the last several years, as the nation transitions to support greater economic growth, utilization of renewable energy sources, and geostrategic goals of networking dominance in other countries. The author focuses particularly on how China has responded to the greater cybersecurity risks that have accompanied the development of its power grid, describing the usage of both top-down policy strategies and bottom-up drives towards basic research in this regard. He also describes the relevance of artificial intelligence and quantum technologies as solutions to the nation’s cybersecurity concerns, noting that these two topics appear less prominently in Chinese cybersecurity discussions than US discussions. Interestingly, the author also draws attention to the concern of whether China and the United States could come to a mutual agreement about denouncing cyber interference in each other’s power grids (“Can the U.S. and China leave grids alone?”). He describes that a precedent for such an agreement exists in the form of a RAND Corporation report, and claims that it represents a reasonable possibility, suggesting some next steps for consideration: “Declaratory statements from China that parallel the U.S. declaration that infrastructure will not be attacked in peacetime. Demonstration from China of additional restraints from mapping and preparing attacks on gas infrastructure . . . Mutual agreement between U.S. and China to avoid hosting offensive cyberoperations from networks that are closely linked to infrastructure networks.” The author notes that an agreement could be constructed in a way that does not contradict the otherwise forward defensive strategy of the United States with regard to cybersecurity policy, and draws the distinction between cyberspace reconnaissance and cyberspace attack to support his ideas.