Recent paper on Cyberwar, with particular respect to the game theory/decision making aspects of the relation between the target and the attackers. The author argues that although the advantage lies in the attacking party in terms of capability, that the blowback/perception on the international level is much more in the hands of the target as opposed to the source of the attack. The author uses examples from many previous incidents involving the use of cyber attacks, including but not limited to Stuxnet, the hacking of Sony, and the Russian cyber attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in 2015/2016. The paper weighs the various ways states can respond to cyber attacks in terms of perception. The attack can be played up in order to villainize the attacker when attribution can be credited, as well as nationalize a state or multiple states against a common enemy, however this opens up the attacked state to criticism if it decides to use cyber weapons in response. States can also choose to downplay cyber attacks to hide it’s own embarrassment/weaknesses, as well as to try and avoid further confrontation from a stronger adversary.