Predicting the Proliferation of Cyber Weapons into Small States

Typical analysis focuses on the impacts of cyberwarfare on large states; proliferation issues involving smaller nations “have received little attention,” despite comprising most of the UN’s states. Increasingly, however, these nations are being forced to make decisions about the role of cyberweapons in their defense portfolios. Though the perception is that cyberweapons are “cheap and effective,” they are largely indirect weapons that “do not alter the fundamental principles of warfare.” Accordingly, their precise definition can be difficult to pinpoint, but includes “us[ing] cyberspace to deliver direct or cascading kinetic effects.” Additionally, cyberwarfare is “offense… dominant”; that being said, cyberspace “dominance [strategies]… may, however, be premature” due to the principal of “escalation dominance,” by which states respond to attacks in cyber with overwhelming force in the conventional arena.
Specifically for small states, the calculation of whether to invest in cyberwarfare depends on their perceived “political or military benefit,” whether it be “over – or in parity with – their adversaries.” These benefits center around affecting enemies’ “C4ISR,” or “command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.” Given this fact, it is possible to define a four-step model to determine the proclivity of a given state toward cyber-proliferation. First, the “quantitative…, behavioral…, [and] identity” characteristics of the nation must be analyzed; for example, a nation with a strong tradition of pacifism may be less likely to proliferate. Second, it is important to consider the resources and policies around cyber-proliferation, an analysis that should consider budgets and intellectual capital. This ties into the weighing of “cyber dependence,” or the degree to which the state relies on cyberspace for routine functioning. Finally, the behavior of the state in question must be compared “against competing security models,” or the tendencies of enemy states.