Discusses covert action – a subject author Aaron Brantly argues is overlooked by academics despite being an important component of the state system – in its current context: computer network operations. Brantly suggests covert cyber action should be examined using “expected utility theory.” He contends the utility of covert cyber-attacks lies in the space between diplomacy and war, or what James D. Fearon considers the “ex-ante bargaining range of state.” Such covert action may be a key tool for “the mitigation of information asymmetries, issue indivisibilities, and commitment problems,” all potential precursors to international conflict. As a result, covert cyber-attacks can improve a state’s bargaining position and/or bring others back to the bargaining table to achieve “positive utility” for an entity attempting to “avert an overt war.” Ultimately, the author concludes covert action should be recognized by the International Relations discipline as an act with the ability to “alter policy relationships of states” and provide “tangible benefits to a government.”
