Schneider presents the dilemma that as militaries use digital, computerized systems to increase their capability, they also introduce new vulnerabilities as a result of those digital systems. She frames this issue as a paradox, saying that “as states continue to develop computer-reliant weapons, so also do they invest in offensive cyber operations to capitalize on the vulnerabilities of otherwise conventionally competent digitized militaries.” She explores this capability/vulnerability paradox in the context of military revolutions generally, arguing that these revolutions can lead to strategic instability in some cases.
Instability, she argues, arises between two states (one of which is more capable than another, but also has more vulnerability based on that capability) because both are incentivized to strike first. The less capable state will want to exploit the more capable state’s vulnerability because it knows it won’t be able to win otherwise, while the more capable state wants to take advantage of its capability before it is disabled. This kind of instability, however, does not occur in all military revolutions – it depends on how good the capability is as well as how vulnerable it is. A highly capable but highly vulnerable resource is “most dangerous” or volatile, while a resource with low capability and/or low vulnerability is less dangerous and more stable. The author argues that the information revolution is obviously a very highly capable innovation, though determining the precise nature or severity of vulnerability it introduces is more difficult to determine. She cites this as an area for further research but claims there will certainly be times when states think they are vulnerable, which could still lead to potentially unstable interactions.
