Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber

Corn and Taylor attempt to simplify and explain the role that sovereignty plays in a state’s cyber activity. In doing so, they point out the importance of understanding sovereignty’s bounds—considering non-state actors like ISIS are using unclear sovereign bounds to wreak physical havoc on people in weak borders. This abuse of weak sovereignty, they claim, will soon be easily translatable to the cyber-sphere. To prevent just this, they outline “jus ad bellum” on the cyber sphere, or the ability to use force, and show that there is an international consensus that countries are within their power to do so. However, they also mention that “cyber actions that amount to a prohibited intervention also violate international law”, or in other words, states are held to a minimum standard in cyber etiquette (Corn and Taylor 211). The principle of non-intervention can be applied in the same way—states that abide by this principle both are expected to restrain themselves when not necessary but are given more support when they need to cyberattack another country. In both two concepts, Corn and Taylor point to the dual benefits of sovereignty, both in terms of offense but also in terms of clearly defined defense. Without strong sovereignty, adherence to these principles is relatively weak. In the context of ISIS, which is decentralized, Corn and Taylor, servers across the world are being used to fund terrorist acts. As such, the principles of jus ad bellum and prohibited intervention, which are key to democratic countries like the United States, aren’t necessarily being followed in their “borders” (even if they happen virtually in their country). As such, the sovereignty becomes more muddled.