Outlines key evidence for her argument that states are unable to agree on the regulation of cyberspace. These include, (a) varying interpretations of what is “secure” and what is perceived as a “threat,”(b) reluctance on the part of the UN group of governmental experts (GGE) to develop and apply international law for and to cyberspace, (c) “wait-and-see tactics,” and (d) common notions that cyberspace is “lawless territory.” This results in an “intermediate phase in cybersecurity diplomacy,” wherein it is deemed “impossible” to adhere and agree to legally binding rules and norms. The article then highlights the growing power and influence of new actors – namely, the business and technical communities that produce content, software, and hardware and control critical infrastructure – who attempt to “benefit from the current uncertain [legal] situation in cyberspace.” Subsequently, Stadnik explores various non-state initiatives for norms in cyberspace, such as the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, Siemens Charter of Trust, Nornikel Charter, and those proposed by the Global Commission on Cyber Stability (GCCS). The article concludes, arguing nation-states will closely follow trends set by non-state actors and apply “appropriate” norms to future intergovernmental proceedings.
