Healey discusses the implications of the United States’ new “persistent engagement” strategy in cyberspace. He begins with an overview of the history of the persistent engagement doctrine, tracing its roots back to “active defense” measures adopted by the U.S. Department of Defense in the late 1990s. He then discusses how U.S. policy was long rooted in the concept of cyber deterrence, but that cyber competition has largely evolved into a more active and persistent endeavor due to improved attribution techniques and increasing understanding of the dynamics of cyber conflict “below the threshold of death and destruction.”
Healey then analyzes the current American persistent engagement strategy, describing it in ten causal steps, beginning with the current state, adversaries conducting attacks to “destabilize the United States” and “degrade” its power, and culminating with the U.S. desired outcomes of increased stability and continued superiority by way of imposing increased costs on adversaries, engaging in tacit bargaining, and improving deterrence. He then turns to a more critical analysis of the policy, warning that though the approach may work, it also comes with significant risks that it may not. “Negative feedback” as a result of tacit bargaining is not a guaranteed outcome and may devolve into precisely the opposite: “tit-for-tat dynamics” as each side tries to outdo the other in a “positive feedback” loop. Healey identifies many pitfalls that the U.S. could fall into while following the persistent engagement strategy and argues that for this approach to work successfully, the U.S. will need to walk a fine line involving patience, subtle operations, and clever signaling.
